Abstract: Conventional wisdom in the philosophy of mind holds (1) that minds are exclusively possessed by individuals and (2) that no constitutive part of a mind can have a mind of its own. For example, the paradigmatic minds of human beings are in the purview of individual organisms and associated closely with the brain; no parts of the brain that are constitutive of a human mind are considered capable of having a mind.1 Let us refer to the conjunction of (1) and (2) as standard individualism about minds (SIAM). Put succinctly, SIAM says that all minds are singular minds. This conflicts with the group mind thesis (GMT), understood as the claim that there are collective types of minds that comprise two or more singular minds among their constitutive parts. The related concept of group cognition refers to psychological states, processes or capacities that are attributes of such collective minds.
Publication Year: 2014
Publication Date: 2014-01-01
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 33
AI Researcher Chatbot
Get quick answers to your questions about the article from our AI researcher chatbot