Abstract: In 1948, Lord Inverchapel reported from Washington that Anglo-Americans relations were entering a new phase. US opinion on British and Soviet activities no longer followed the 'see-saw pattern', which was so 'astonishingly' constant during the war and in the years following it. In Churchillian language, the ambassador argued, 'responsible' Americans took it for granted that the destinies of Britain and the United States were 'inseparably bound together' by the 'coincidence' of moral and strategic interests. Harmonious relations also now existed in the embassy's dealings with members of the Truman administration, as exposure to problems in Greece, Palestine, and disturbances in India; along with the 'ultimatum-like "request"' for a US trusteeship over the former Japanese Mandated Islands1 in 1947, had had 'a telling effect' on Britain's American critics. A distinction between 'imperialism' and safeguarding 'legitimate' overseas interests was, Inverchapel concluded, 'coming to be appreciated'.2 Despite this analysis, it was US presidential election year, and the prospects for a Truman victory were not high, which meant a possible change of the administration and policy. Inverchapel was certainly no champion of Truman, while the ambassador's residency in Washington was marked by boredom, his inability to ingratiate himself with Washington society and leading American figures, and poor relations with the State Department.3 These factors and the suspected imminence of Truman's departure went some way to explaining why US officials conversed rather guardedly with the British about the future of East Asia. The trouble was that the new direction of US policy was beginning to provoke Anglo-American divergences.
Publication Year: 2009
Publication Date: 2009-01-01
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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