Title: Nash Equilibria of Market Games: Finiteness and Inefficiency**The research reported in this paper was partially supported by grant No. SOC77-27435 from the National Science Foundation, and by Contract N00014-77-C0518 issued by the Office of Naval Research under Contract Authority NR-047-006.
Abstract: This chapter discusses that under appropriate conditions, the Nash Equilibria of finite-player strategic market games are generically inefficient. The conditions are: (1) the dimension of each trader's strategy set is at most l — 1, where l is the number of commodities, (2) the mapping from strategies to net trades is sufficiently smooth, and (3) so are the traders' preferences. For concreteness, the chapter presents a specific model—the so-called sell-all model. The traders' preferences are quite standard and not particularly restrictive; a smooth mapping from strategies to net trades is necessary. The chapter presents the analogous finiteness results obtained for the Walras Equilibria of markets by Debreu, Smale, and others.
Publication Year: 1982
Publication Date: 1982-01-01
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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