Abstract: Abstract A problem which has arisen frequently in contemporary philosophy is: "How are contingent identity statements possible?" This question is phrased by analogy with the way Kant phrased his question "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" It has usually been taken for granted in the one case by Kant that synthetic a priori judgments were possible, and in the other case in contemporary philosophical literature that contingent statements of identity are possible. This chapter argues that in both the case of names and the case of the theoretical identifications, the identity statements are necessary and not contingent. That is to say, they are necessary if true; of course, false identity statements are not necessary. This view is defended by first distinguishing between the terms rigid and nonrigid designator, and the notions of a prioricity and necessity.
Publication Year: 2011
Publication Date: 2011-12-06
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 252
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