Abstract: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, by Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922–1996), descended upon us like a whirlwind; it utterly transformed pivotal issues in the history and philosophy of science, especially in the field of methodology. Just a list of the terms Kuhn introduced – pre-paradigm, paradigm, normal science and puzzle solving, anomaly, crisis, revolutionary change, incommensurability, textbook-derived tradition – tells by now an old and familiar story. I have little to add to that story – not directly, anyway. This is not because that story led to settled conclusions; hardly any book of any significance does that, let alone Kuhn's book. Rather, what I want to do, in this chapter, is to use some of Kuhn's intriguing concepts and theories in order to fashion out of them – something Kuhn himself never did – a theory of group rationality. My hope is that this will lead to a reexamination of his beguiling texts, for this reason: Kuhn's distinctive subjectivist view of group rationality offers a unique – startling, truth to tell – view of the philosophical landscape.
Publication Year: 2007
Publication Date: 2007-04-16
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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