Title: <i>Assertion: on the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech</i>By Sanford G. Goldberg
Abstract: The idea that assertion is governed by a constitutive norm has received a lot of attention in recent years, with intense debate over what the precise formulation of the norm should be. But why should any of us be interested in that? In his new book, Sanford Goldberg aims to answer that question by showing how the hypothesis that assertion answers to an epistemic norm both explains the epistemic significance of assertion and has implications for a number of philosophically interesting phenomena. The result is an impressive work, with a lot to say about assertion and its connections to epistemology, language, mind and ethics. The book is arranged into four parts. Part I introduces the topic and presents an initial case for a norm-based account of assertion, contrasting it with rivals and defending it from recent objections levelled by Maitra (2010) and Cappelen (2010) among others. Part II argues that the hypothesis that assertion answers to an epistemic norm neatly explains assertion’s epistemic significance: its role in the communication of knowledge, and the entitlements and responsibilities generated by assertion for speakers and hearers. Part III explores the connections between assertion and a number of philosophically interesting phenomena in light of such a norm: topics include the method of interpretation (Ch. 4), assertoric content (Ch. 5), Moore’s paradox and norms of belief (Ch. 6), the ethics of assertion (Ch. 7) and anonymous assertion (Ch. 8). Part IV breaks from the rest and defends the view that the norm of assertion is context-sensitive.
Publication Year: 2016
Publication Date: 2016-06-23
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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