Abstract: On the Nature of Moral Judgment Nalini Elisa Ramlakhan ([email protected]) Institute of Cognitive Science, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6 Abstract I critically examine the existing data in emotion research to show that empathy is not necessary for moral judgment. I argue that other emotions, such as disgust, are responsible for moral judgment, and that humans are able to make moral judgments without empathy. Autistic individuals are of interest because they are said to lack empathy, yet display some form of morality. Thus, empathy cannot be the core motivator in moral judgment. Keywords: empathy, morality, moral judgment, autism, emotion, disgust, intuition. Introduction Empathy is the ability to vicariously share the emotions of others. Empathy involves imagining another’s psychological state while maintaining a self-other differentiation; it is knowing another person’s state of mind without their state of mind being the same as yours (Howe, 2013). Empathy as a whole involves both a cognitive component, recognizing what another person is feeling, and an affective component, vicariously sharing an emotion very similar to what you think another individual is feeling. It is widely agreed that empathy as delineated is needed for moral judgment. Some researchers, such as David Howe (2013), claim that “empathy oils the wheels of social life” (p. 15). Other emotion researchers, such as Abigail Marsh (in press) and Simon Baron-Cohen (2011), argue that empathy is at the core of morality. Recently, this view has been criticized, notably by philosopher Jesse J. Prinz. In this paper, I examine whether empathy plays a significant role in moral judgment, while examining which emotions are responsible for moral judgment. Although the question of whether empathy is responsible for moral development is an important one, this paper focuses only on moral judgment. I argue that empathy does not play a key role in moral judgment, and other emotions, such as disgust, are responsible for moral judgment. Furthermore, I argue that, despite lacking empathy, autistic individuals display instances of morality, thus empathy cannot be considered the core of moral judgment. Moral Judgment By ‘moral judgment’, I simply mean the judgments that individuals believe to be moral, where a moral judgment overrides other judgments. Moral judgment occurs when an individual judges whether another individual or group of individuals have transgressed a norm that is considered to override other norms. An action is usually considered a moral transgression if the impermissibility of the action still holds if an authority figure said that it is permissible to commit the act (e.g., murdering someone for their car even if the Prime Minister said that it is permissible to do so). Moral norms override other norms. However, in many cultures, moral judgment is tied to religious authority, where moral norms are viewed as sacred and are usually commanded by an authority figure (e.g., imams or pundits). In these cases, moral norms override other norms, but are bound by an authority figure. For instance, eating pork in Islamic cultures or beef in Hindu cultures is viewed as a moral transgression because God prohibits the consumption of these animals. This norm trumps other norms and is considered moral rather than conventional because the judgment that it is wrong to consume pork in Islamic cultures or beef in Hindu cultures overrides other norms. There are also moral judgments that are dissociated from affect. These are moral judgments based solely on reason. An example of a moral judgment dissociated from affect is making the judgment that stealing from independently owned markets is morally wrong because it takes away from a family’s livelihood. It is possible to make this judgment without having an accompanying emotional reaction to the situation; you don’t need to feel the emotion of anger or guilt when making this judgment. Rather, you may reach this judgment through reason alone. My paper is not concerned with judgments of this nature. This paper focuses only on moral judgments that are caused or accompanied by affect (e.g., moral judgments caused by emotion and moral judgments that cause corresponding emotions). Emotion An emotion can be thought of as a feeling that consists of specific representational or propositional content accompanied by a specific sensational reaction. To experience an emotion is to feel a certain way about something (representational or propositional content) and have a corresponding feeling. For example, if I say that murder is wrong and would feel guilty if I murdered someone or sad if someone else is murdered, I am experiencing either guilt or sadness in response to some propositional content. Therefore, if I am feeling guilty or sad, there is something that I am feeling guilty or sad about. Furthermore, this paper concerns both lower-level and higher-level emotions. Lower-level emotions include primitive emotions, such as happiness, sadness, disgust, fear, and anger. Lower-level emotions tend to be universal and basic, and can also be found in primates. Higher-level
Publication Year: 2014
Publication Date: 2014-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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