Abstract: Whether perceptual experience has content or not is an important issue in research on mentalist philosophy and epistemology.Most contemporary philosophers assert that perceptual experience is a form of representation and therefore has content.This view is called the Content and has been challenged by philosophers such as Charles Travis and Bill Brewer who argue that Content View is not compatible with Na?ve Realism which favors that perceptual experience is relation between subjects and mind-independent objects and properties.This paper analyzes rationale of Content View proposed by Travis and Brewer and concludes that Content View and Relational View are not contradictory.It is suggested that Content View should incorporate some views of Relational View if former aims to be supported in epistemological terms.This paper also argues that perceptual experience has some Russellian propositional content in mode of presentation.
Publication Year: 2011
Publication Date: 2011-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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