Title: Research on Ultimate Control and Invisible Benefits of Controlling Shareholders
Abstract: The paper analyzes the ultimate control models and invisible benefits of large shareholders according to the separation of control rights and cash flow rights. Pyramidal ownership structures and cross-ownership structures are two important approaches to separate control rights from cash flow rights for large shareholders. And the approaches give strong incentives in large shareholders to control shareholders and expropriate small shareholders. The paper introduces a model to analyze the producing mechanism of large shareholders' expropriation. Based on the model, the paper discusses the essential reason for expropriation, and concludes the reason is that large shareholders can obtain absolute control rights by possessing smaller cash flow rights; consequently, they are able to snatch more invisible benefits from control.
Publication Year: 2005
Publication Date: 2005-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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