Title: Equity Incentives,Bank Debt Constraints,Private Benefits of Control Right and Managers' Over-investment Behavior of State-Holding Listed Companies in China
Abstract: On the basis of current literature,taking China's state-holding listed companies as background,we study the effects of equity incentives,bank debt constraints and private benefits of control right on managers' over-investment behavior of China's state-holding listed companies theoretically and empirically.The theoretical research results show that,the managers' over-investment behavior of listed companies are negatively related to their equity incentives and positively related to their private benefits of control right.When bank debt financing has positive regulatory flexibility or small negative regulatory flexibility,managers' over-investment behavior of listed companies decreases in their bank debt financing;and when bank debt financing has big negative regulatory flexibility,managers' over-investment behaviors of listed companies increases in their bank debt financing.The empirical research results further test and verify validity and rationality of the above-mentioned theoretical research results.
Publication Year: 2013
Publication Date: 2013-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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