Title: Duopoly,Nonlinear Pricing and Market Segmentation
Abstract: The author analyzes the nonlinear pricing behaviors and the market equilibrium of asymmetric duopoly enterprises under the assumption that the asymmetric duopoly and the Arrow-Pratt's risk aversion of customers are constants.He believes that when the optimal nonlinear pricing of the duopoly enterprises is achieved based on their marginal costs,their pricing packages are crossed which leads to market segmentation.High level consumers will choose the pricing package of low cost enterprise,with the low level consumers in the contrary.When duopoly enterprises make price game and result in competition,the competitive equilibrium price will be crossed,which further leads to market segmentation as well.The conclusion of the paper will give some theoretical enlightenment to the price regulation of duopoly industry.
Publication Year: 2010
Publication Date: 2010-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
Access and Citation
AI Researcher Chatbot
Get quick answers to your questions about the article from our AI researcher chatbot