Title: Being-in-the-world, Temporality and Autopoiesis
Abstract:Encounters between phenomenology and cognitive science are nowadays no longer a novelty. The decades that have passed since Hubert L. Dreyfus told MIT researchers that they could learn something by re...Encounters between phenomenology and cognitive science are nowadays no longer a novelty. The decades that have passed since Hubert L. Dreyfus told MIT researchers that they could learn something by reading Being and Time have seen the rise of a flourishing discourse that has become greater than the sum of its parts. Recent times have seen what began as a primarily critical interaction, with various authors (including Dreyfus himself) drawing upon phenomenological accounts to reject computational models of the mind and the quest for what Haugeland called ‘Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence’, develop into a more constructive, positive discourse that seeks to unite the disciplines in mutually-enriching research projects.2 Various streams within the contemporary study and philosophy of cognition draw upon the resources of the phenomenological tradition to anchor, substantiate or flesh out their accounts of cognition as always-already situated and purposive. Given the prominent role that Heidegger’s account of Being-in-the-world played within the initial movement of phenomenological critique, the question of how it might most fruitfully engage with what we could call the ‘positive turn’ towards a collaborative dialogue between phenomenology and cognitive science presents itself with a natural urgency.3Read More
Publication Year: 2015
Publication Date: 2015-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 13
AI Researcher Chatbot
Get quick answers to your questions about the article from our AI researcher chatbot