Title: Incorporation of a Risk Analysis Approach for Advanced Safeguards Analysis.
Abstract: Proliferation resistance features that reduce the likelihood of diversion of nuclear materials from the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle are critical for a global nuclear future. A framework that monitors process information continuously can demonstrate the ability to resist proliferation by measuring and reducing diversion risk, thus ensuring the legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle. The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation makes this possible by generating instantaneous system state data that can be used to track and measure the status of the process and material at any given time. ADVANCED TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK The term “transparency” is used in many different applications. In the context of the nuclear fuel cycle, we define it as: “...a high-level concept, defined as a confidence building approach among political entities, possibly in support of multi-lateral agreements, to ensure civilian nuclear facilities are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. Additionally, nuclear fuel cycle transparency involves the cooperative sharing of relevant nuclear material, process, and facility information among all authorized parties to ensure the safe and legitimate use of nuclear material and technology. A system is considered transparent when the parties involved feel that the proliferation risk is at an acceptable level. For this to occur, proliferation risk should be monitored in a continuous fashion.” (Love et al., 2006) 1 This work jointly sponsored by the Japan Atomic Energy Agency and Sandia National Laboratories under a Memorandum of Understanding No. 05-S-430. Sandia National Laboratories is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy under contract DEAC04-94AL85000.