Title: Politicians against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Postauthorization Brazil
Abstract: Many Latin American countries returned to civilian rule in the 1980s and 1990s after being governed by the military for much of the previous two decades. How the military conducts itself in the current period critically affects whether democracy can develop and become robust in these countries. Where the armed forces play an active role in politics, they limit popular sovereignty, the guiding principle of democracy. As civilian rule enters its second decade in Argentina, the first major Latin American country to return to democracy, followed shortly by Uruguay and Brazil and then Chile, it becomes imperative to ask and possibly to begin answering several key questions. What impact did the regime changes of the 1980s have on the role of the military in politics? Has democracy motivated and enabled elected officials to diminish significantly the political influence of the armed forces? Or have military elites been able to maintain their political clout in the democratic era and undermine the independence and authority of their civilian successors?' This article probes these questions for Brazil, where the military ruled from 1964 to 1985.2 Much of the literature on civil-military relations in postauthoritarian South America stresses the continuing influence of the military and the limits to democracy's consolidation. Analysts expected that the Brazilian armed forces would be particularly likely to exercise control over a broad range of political and socioeconomic issues after the transfer of power to civilians in 1985.3 The basis of this expectation lay in the strength of the military government's bargaining position vis-a-vis civilians during the transition to civilian rule, which resulted in the armed forces' retention of institutional prerogatives, including six cabinet positions and a predominant presence in the National Security Council (CSN) and National Information Service (SNI), agencies synonymous with the abuse of human rights under the dictatorship. It was predicted that these prerogatives would provide the military with a strong foundation for exercising tutelage over civilians and protecting the privileges of their institution in the new democracy. My findings, based on evidence that extends to mid 1993, cast doubt on the expectation that the military would be an extraordinarily powerful force in Brazil's new democracy. Over time, democratically elected politicians have successfully contested the power of the military over a broad range of issues and narrowed its sphere of influence. For example, congress defied the military and vastly expanded the right of workers to strike in 1988 and 1989. It has also steadily reduced the military's share of the budget. President Collor took steps to restructure the military-dominated intelligence service and security council in 1990. Likewise he confronted the armed forces' previously unchallenged control over nuclear issues by signing an agreement with Argentina allowing for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Similarly, by endorsing measures to curb ecological devastation
Publication Year: 1995
Publication Date: 1995-07-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 29
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