Title: Research on SC Competitive Model and SC Coordination
Abstract: This paper studies the competitive model of two supply chains and SC coordination under SC competition. First, we separate demand using the consumer choice theory and obtain the demand distribution function of each product from the given demand distribution function of two products. Second, we prove that the manufacturer can't coordinate both the retailer's quantity and pricing decisions under SC competition with a wholesale price contract, a buy-barck contract, a quantity-flexibility contractor a sales-rebate contract, except a revenue sharing contract. Finally, an example is put forward to analyze the performance of two supply chains under three scenarios: both supply chains, only one or neither being coordinated. It shows that SC coordination is a dominant strategy for both supply chains, but as in the prisoner's dilemma, both supply chains are worse off under the coordinated scenario relative to the uncoordinated scenario because of fiercer competition. The consumers are the only guaranteed beneficiaries of SC coordination.
Publication Year: 2009
Publication Date: 2009-01-05
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 1
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