Title: Aggregation and Disaggregation of European Players in the IMF Compound Games
Abstract: We address the question of the desirability of the merger of the representatives
of European States at the International Monetary Fund using the classical
concept of value from cooperative game theory. We decompose the whole game
into a main quotient game (the Executive Directors� Game) and different subgames
(the European and Constituencies ones). The classical composition of
games being here inadequate, we axiomatically define a new product operator
on the space of simple games. Under this new product, it is shown that
the value of the product of the games is equal to the product of the values of
the subgames and the quotient game. Using the probabilistic representation of
values, we provide a formal interpretation of this product as an independence
assumption with respect to the probability of coalition formations between the
different games that identifies our restriction as an orthogonality condition.
This property leads to the nice feature that it becomes possible to aggregate
and disaggregate easily the value of the whole game, depending on the kind of
player, European Union or European States, we want to consider.
Publication Year: 2002
Publication Date: 2002-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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