Title: Disagreement in Markets with Matching and Bargaining
Abstract:This paper develops an explanation of why bargainers often terminate negotiations in disagreement in spite of positive expected gains from continued negotiation. The key to the analysis is a model whi...This paper develops an explanation of why bargainers often terminate negotiations in disagreement in spite of positive expected gains from continued negotiation. The key to the analysis is a model which embeds bargaining activity within a market. Agents are continually faced with the choice between continuing to bargain with an existing partner or searching for a new partner. Bargainers may then terminate negotiations without an agreement, in spite of positive expected gains from continued bargaining, because seeking a new bargaining partner promises a higher return.Read More
Publication Year: 1992
Publication Date: 1992-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 44
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