Abstract:In Chapter 6, we studied the economics of organizational forms in the firm. The firm was broadly defined as a nexus of contracts, but the interlocking webs of contractual relations made it impractical...In Chapter 6, we studied the economics of organizational forms in the firm. The firm was broadly defined as a nexus of contracts, but the interlocking webs of contractual relations made it impractical to nail down a more precise definition. Our subject thus became the economics of contracts. In Chapter 7, we go beyond questions relating to the nature of the firm and apply transaction-costs analysis to various organizational forms and market practices. The coverage is not exhaustive. Rather it serves as an illustration of Neoinstitutional Economics in action. We hope to demonstrate, through our examples, that the relative economic advantage of alternative contractual forms is rooted in transaction costs and cannot be explained in terms of frictionless neoclassical economics.Read More
Publication Year: 1990
Publication Date: 1990-06-29
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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