Abstract: In the standard model of voting, a voting rule maps voters' preferences over candidates, represented by total orders over the candidate set, to one or more election winners. There are many different voting rules that are used in a variety of real-life settings. In this talk, we will discuss a recently proposed framework for defining voting rules that is called distancerationalizability. In this framework, a voting rule is defined in terms of the smallest number of modifications (distance) needed to transform a given preference profile into one that has an obvious winner (a consensus). We show that many classic voting rules can be viewed within this framework, for different notions of distance and consensus, and discuss the implications of these results, as well as the limits of this approach. This is based on joint work with Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko.
Publication Year: 2010
Publication Date: 2010-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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