Title: I've got the power: Granting bureaucrats discretion
Abstract: We compare the traditional system of bureaucratic oversight by complaints and investigations with a system of bureaucratic discretion in which bureaucrats are accorded the freedom to manage a budget or quota without external interference. We nd that more pro-social agents { ie, those most likely to overspend when managed by complaints and investigations { should be granted discretion to manage their own budgets. On the other hand, the less pro-social should be managed by oversight. We show that the limits of bureaucratic eciency highlighted by Prendergast (2003) can be exceeded by allowing certain bureaucrats more discretion. We show that it is possible to screen between bureaucrats of dierent levels of pro-social motivation, so that bureaucrats
Publication Year: 2014
Publication Date: 2014-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
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