Title: Incentive strategies with threats in dynamic constrained-stackelberg problems. a bilevel programming approach
Abstract: Dynamic constrained-Stackelberg equilibrium problems are two player differential games, with constraints on decision variables, where the two players, namely the Leader and the Follower, are not in a symmetric position, becasue of their different access to information,and announce their strategies sequentially. Inparticular, the Leader dominates the entire game by imposing a solution which is favourable to himself using incentive strategies with threats In this paper the linear-quadratic case is considered, and a new resolution approach, based on methodologies pertaining to bilevel mathematical programming (BLP), is presented. The basic framework of the proposed approach has been validated by solving a wide range of randomly generated instances whose computational results are reported and discussed here
Publication Year: 1996
Publication Date: 1996-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 2
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