Title: The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe
Abstract: GovernanceVolume 18, Issue 3 p. 347-373 The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe MARK THATCHER, MARK THATCHER London School of EconomicsSearch for more papers by this author MARK THATCHER, MARK THATCHER London School of EconomicsSearch for more papers by this author First published: 13 June 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00280.xCitations: 84AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Abstract Governments and legislatures in Europe have created or greatly strengthened independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). Yet they also retain many formal controls over those agencies. The article analyzes whether elected politicians have used their powers to create IRAs in their own image and kept IRAs under tight control or whether they have allowed IRAs to become a distinct set of actors, hence a "third force" in regulation. Principal–agent (PA) theories, largely based on U.S. experience, emphasize the importance of certain formal controls for elected politicians to limit "agency losses." However, an analysis of four European nations between 1990 and 2001 shows that elected politicians did not use their powers to appoint party politicians, force the early departures of IRA members, reverse IRA decisions, or reduce IRA budgets and powers. Using PA theory, two interpretations of this apparent puzzle are offered, each with differing implications for agency autonomy. 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Publication Year: 2005
Publication Date: 2005-06-13
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 210
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