Title: Gravitation or discrimination? Determinants of litigation in the World Trade Organisation
Abstract: European Journal of Political ResearchVolume 50, Issue 2 p. 143-167 Gravitation or discrimination? Determinants of litigation in the World Trade Organisation THOMAS SATTLER, Corresponding Author THOMAS SATTLER School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Ireland;Thomas Sattler, School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland. E-mail: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorTHOMAS BERNAUER, THOMAS BERNAUER Centre for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zürich, SwitzerlandSearch for more papers by this author THOMAS SATTLER, Corresponding Author THOMAS SATTLER School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Ireland;Thomas Sattler, School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland. E-mail: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorTHOMAS BERNAUER, THOMAS BERNAUER Centre for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zürich, SwitzerlandSearch for more papers by this author First published: 10 January 2011 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01924.xCitations: 63Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract The strong presence of large countries in World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement and the absence of very poor ones have raised concerns that increasing legalisation in the global trading system has not diminished discrimination against less powerful countries as much as expected. This article examines dispute initiations in all WTO member state dyads in 1995–2003 to shed more light on this issue. The analysis suggests that the main driver of dispute initiation is a gravitational one: larger economies and bigger traders are more likely to become involved in trade disputes primarily because their economies are more diversified, and also because greater market size makes them more attractive targets of litigation. While evidence is not found for discriminatory effects against countries with small legal capacity, the results of the article point to a more complex form of power bias – namely a preponderance effect. They suggest that disputes among country dyads including a much more powerful defendant than complainant or vice versa are dealt with outside the WTO. This finding is potentially worrying because it is, arguably, easier to reduce legal capacity differences than to reduce power differences. References Abbott, K.W. et al. (2000). The concept of legalization. International Organization 54(3): 401–419. Allee, T. (2003). Going to Geneva? Trade Protection and Dispute Resolution under the GATT and WTO. Manuscript. University of Illinois. Allee, T. (2004). Legal Incentives and Domestic Rewards: The Selection of Trade Disputes for GATT/WTO Dispute Resolution. Manuscript. University of Illinois. Allee, T. (2005). Developing Countries and the Initiation of GATT/WTO Disputes. 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