Title: Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators
Abstract:Are subnational political elites, such as governors, capable of affecting the voting behavior of national representatives even in the face of high legislative discipline? We address this question by e...Are subnational political elites, such as governors, capable of affecting the voting behavior of national representatives even in the face of high legislative discipline? We address this question by estimating the exogenous causal effect of gubernatorial influence on the voting behavior of national legislators in Mexico, where constitutional provisions guarantee that the political survival times of governors and legislators are fixed and known ex ante and where we can thus know precisely which legislators will leave congress before their state governor's term has expired. We posit that such legislators will be more willing to represent gubernatorial preferences because they expect the governor to find them employment upon finishing their stay in congress. We find that governors whose terms end after the term of the national assembly are able to systematically increase the voting cohesion of legislators from their own party and state and that these effects are substantively important.Read More
Publication Year: 2011
Publication Date: 2011-04-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 85
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