Abstract: NoûsVolume 38, Issue 3 p. 407-429 Vagueness in the World Ken Akiba, Ken Akiba Virginia Commonwealth UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Ken Akiba, Ken Akiba Virginia Commonwealth UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 06 August 2004 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00476.xCitations: 64AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Akiba, K. 1999 “On Super- and Subvaluationism: A Classicist's Reply to Hyde,” Mind 108, 727–32. 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Citing Literature Volume38, Issue3September 2004Pages 407-429 ReferencesRelatedInformation
Publication Year: 2004
Publication Date: 2004-08-06
Language: en
Type: article
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Cited By Count: 103
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