Title: Turkish–Azerbaijani Energy Cooperation and Nabucco: Testing the Limits of the New Turkish Foreign Policy Rhetoric
Abstract: Abstract Abstract This article examines the prospects of the Turkish government's rhetoric of following zero‐problems with neighbors and pursuing ‘positive‐sum’ strategies to foster regional cooperation. Through a detailed examination of the Turkish–Azerbaijani energy cooperation in the context of the Nabucco natural gas pipeline, the article concludes that this policy is unsustainable and Turkey will come under pressure to set a more realistic foreign policy agenda that prioritizes among the country's strategic relationships. Moreover, although many believe that Turkey's overtures to Armenia lie at the heart of the troubles in Turkish–Azerbaijani energy talks, this article suggests that the real causes are the diverging interests between the two countries due to the underlying incompatibilities of their energy policies, breeding a ‘negative‐sum’ game. Notes 1. For Turkey's peace‐broker role, see: Bülent Aras, “Turkey's Rise in the Greater Middle East: Peace‐Building in the Periphery,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2009), pp. 29–41. 2. See, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğang's State of the Union addresses, dated October 31, 2009, and May 31, 2009; available at: http://www.bbm.gov.tr/Forms/p_NationAnouncemet.aspx. 3. This is largely attributed to Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. See his: Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2008), pp. 77–96; for an early analysis of this doctrine before Davutoğlu's appointment as foreign minister, see: A. Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6 (2006), pp. 945–64. 4. “Erdoğan: İslam Dünyasının Lideri Olmaya Çalışmıyorum,” Anadolu Ajansı, December 11, 2009; “Davutoğlu: Turkey a Crossroads of Global Energy Transportation,” Today's Zaman, August 10, 2009. 5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Energy Strategy, January 2009. 6. The resulting dependence on foreign resources is the main criticism directed against Turkey's energy policies, see: Necdet Pamir, “Enerji Arz Güvenliği Ve Türkiye,” Stratejik Analiz, March 2007, pp. 14–24. 7. Energy Information Administration's Country Analysis Brief on Turkey, April 2009, available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Turkey/Background.html. 8. Elin Süleymanov, “Azerbaijan – a Partner for Europe in Energy Security,” in Svante E. Cornell and Niklas Nilsson (eds.), Europe's Energy Security: Gazprom's Dominance and Caspian Supply Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia – Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2008), pp. 115–24; John Roberts, The Role of Azerbaijan in European Gas Supply and the Greek Interest (ICBSS, Policy Brief, No: 15, 2009). 9. Süha Bölükbaşı, “Ankara's Baku‐Centered Transcaucasia Policy: Has It Failed?,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1997), pp. 80–94; Mustafa Aydin, “Foucault's Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2004), pp. 1–22. 10. Richard Morningstar, “Address to CERA Conference,” Washington, D.C., December 7, 1998, available at: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morning.htm. 11. Ali Karaosmanoglu, “Turkey's Objectives in the Caspian Region,” in Gennady Chufrin (ed.), The Security of the Caspian Sea Region (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 156–7. 12. Huseyin Bagci and Saban Kardas, “Post‐September 11 Impact: Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited,” in Francois Heisbourg (ed.), Turkey's Strategic Future (Brussels: European Security Forum, May 2003), pp. 19–48. 13. Tuncay Babali, “Implications of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Main Oil Pipeline Project,” Perceptions, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2005), pp. 29–60. 14. “Bakü‐Ceyhan'da Temel Atılıyor,” Radikal, September 18, 2002. However, when the pipeline was finally concluded in 2006, the construction costs in the section of the BTC in Turkey reached $1.8 billion, and exceeded the $300 million committed by Turkey, which created an additional problem between Turkey and the consortium. 15. The United States also came under criticism from the business community for exerting pressure to realize this project despite its commercial disadvantages. 16. Zeyno Baran and Robert A. Smith, “The Energy Dimension in American Policy towards the Black Sea Region,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2007), p. 267. 17. Mehmet Dikkaya and Deniz Özyakışır, “Developing Regional Cooperation among Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan: Importance of Regional Projects,” Perceptions, Vol. 13, No. 1–2 (2008), pp. 93–118. 18. Germana Canzi, “Turkmenistan's Caspian Resources and Its International Political Economy,” in Shirin Akiner, (ed.), The Caspian: Politics, Energy and Security (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 187. 19. Gareth M. Winrow, “Turkey and the East–West Gas Transportation Corridor,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2004), pp. 23–42. 20. See the edited volume: Cornell and Nilsson (eds.) (2008). 21. Yusuf Yazar and Hasan Hüseyin Erkaya, “Whither Turkey's Energy Policy?,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2007), pp. 7–22. 22. European Commission, “Communication from the Commission: Second Strategic Energy Review: An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan” (Brussels: European Commission, 2008). 23. Vladimir Socor, “Shaking Down the Turkic Brother? Turkey's AKP Government Obstructs Azerbaijan's Gas Outlet to Europe,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 50 (2009). 24. There are two opposing interpretation of the implications of the growing interest of various pipeline projects in the Azerbaijani gas. One view suggests that the realization of such smaller‐scale projects might in fact form a direct link to the Caspian resources, boosting the interest of investors, producers and consumers. Such a development might eventually facilitate the construction of a more ambitious project like Nabucco. Others contend that these smaller pipelines, such as Trans‐Adriatic Pipeline, might “swallow up Azerbaijan's initial gas output and increase doubts over Nabucco's viability at a critical time.” Katinka Barysch, “Should the Nabucco Pipeline Project be Shelved?” Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, May 2010, p. 10. 25. See the Nabucco Consortium's website: http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/project/project-phases-milestones/index.html; Roberts (2009), p. 6. 26. “Gazprom Ready to Buy Azerbaijani Gas at Market Prices – Envoy,” RIA Novosti, June 4, 2008. 27. Alman Mir Ismail, “Is the West Losing the Energy Game in the Caspian?,” CACI Analyst, May 6, 2009. 28. Azerbaijan's support for the Sofia and Prague summits, and Aliyev's signature of the final declaration of the Prague Summit on Southern Corridor in May came as a relief to the promoters of the Nabucco project. See: G.M. Winrow, Problems and Prospects for the “Fourth Corridor”: The Positions and Role of Turkey in Gas Transit to Europe (London: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2009), p. 5. 29. “Definite Progress Gives Us Hopes That the Conflict Will Be Resolved Soon Enough: President of Azerbaijan,” Trend News, April 17, 2009. 30. “Russia Ready to Buy Azerbaijani Gas at Record Price,” RIA Novosti, June 30, 2009. 31. “Azerbaijan Fully Supports Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project: Minister,” Trend Capital, July 13, 2009. 32. The revised price would be effective from April 2008, and Turkey underscored that it would retroactively compensate Azerbaijan for the price differences. 33. This arrangement enabled Turkey to develop the TGI project through which it is re‐exporting Azeri gas to Greece. 34. “Total: Shah Deniz Transit Talks with Turkey ‘Difficult’,” APA, November 19, 2009; Robert M. Cutler, “Azerbaijan Looks Past Turkey,” Asia Times, December 4, 2009. 35. Barçın Yinanç, “Ermenistan'la Sınır Kapısını Açarsanız Gazınızı Keserim,” Referans, April 2, 2009. 36. “Erdoğan: İşgal Sona Ermeden Ermenistan Sınırı Açılmaz,” Radikal, May 13, 2009. 37. “Yıldız: Azeri Gazında Fiyat Adil Oldu,” Radikal, May 16, 2009; “Azeri Gazını Düşük Fiyattan Alacağız,” Hürriyet, November 16, 2009. 38. “Aliyev'in Doğal Gaz Isyanı,” Hürriyet, October 18, 2009. 39. “‘Türkiye'yi Test Etmeye Kalkmayın’,” Radikal, October 21, 2009; Fikret Bila, “Böyle Giderlerse Sil Baştan Yaparız,” Milliyet, October 23, 2009. 40. “Bakan Yıldız'dan Azeri Gazı Yorumu: Anlaşma Yapılmazsa Çaresiz Değiliz,” Cihan Haber Ajansı, October 30, 2009. 41. Fariz Ismailzade, “Azerbaijan Seeks Alternative Gas Export Routes: Sending a Signal to Ankara,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 122 (2009). 42. “Turkey Energy Minister Says Near End of Azeri Gas Talks,” Azernews, February 4, 2010. 43. Saban Kardas, “Turkish–Azeri Deal May Herald New Competition in Southern Corridor,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 7, No. 115 (2010). 44. Brian Whitmore, “Azerbaijan Could Scuttle Nabucco over Turkey–Armenia Deal,” RFE/RL, October 19, 2009. 45. “Davutoğlu'ndan Ermenistan Izahatı,” Radikal, November 29, 2009. 46. Michael Mainville, “Angry at Turkey, Energy‐Rich Azerbaijan May Spurn West,” AFP, November 30, 2009. 47. “Bakan Bağış En Büyük Hedefini Açıkladı,” Anadolu Ajansı, April 17, 2009. 48. Roberts (2009), p. 7. 49. “Azerbaijan Has Two Priorities for Gas Export from Shah Deniz Field within Second Stage: Minister,” Trend News, November 14, 2009. 50. Ironically, Turkish PM Erdoğan on many occasions questioned the feasibility of Nabucco, underlining that it has no supply commitments. “Turkish PM Doubts Feasibility of Nabucco Project,” AzerNEWS, November 20, 2009. 51. Vladimir Socor, “Recent Initiatives to Advance the Nabucco Project,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 14 (2009). 52. For Azerbaijan's use of “oil card,” see: Pinar Ipek, “Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy and Challenges for Energy Security,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 63, No. 2 (2009), in particular, pp. 229–33. 53. It is therefore increasingly argued that Azerbaijan uses cooperation with Russia as a bargaining chip to solicit Russia's help to settle the Nagorno‐Karabakh conflict, see: Shahin Abbasov, “Azerbaijan: Is Baku Offering a Natural Gas Carrot to Moscow for Help with Karabakh?,” Eurasia Insight, April 20, 2009. 54. John Roberts, “Turkey as a Regional Energy Hub,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2010), pp. 47–8. 55. TBMM Tutanak Müdürlüğü, “Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu Görüşme Tutanakları,” November 16, 2009. 56. TBMM Tutanak Müdürlüğü, “Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu Görüşme Tutanakları,” November 17, 2009. 57. Ibid. 58. “Azerbaijan's Gas Transit to Be Solved Soon: Turkish FM,” Trend Capital, December 7, 2009. 59. See the conclusions of a workshop on Turkey–Azerbaijan relations, held on June 25–27, 2009, in Ankara: http://www.setav.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=886&Itemid=57. 60. “Turkish Foreign Policy—Dreams from Their Fathers,” Economist, July 23, 2009. 61. Ian Lesser, The New Turkish Lexicon (On Turkey Series, GMF, 2009); a related line of criticism questions the intentions of the government, attributing recent transformations to its ideological makeup. They charge the government for abandoning Turkey's pro‐Western foreign policy credential and “reorienting” toward the Middle Eastern or Islamic causes. 62. “İyi Niyet Görmüyorum,” Anadolu Ajansı, December 9, 2009. 63. Suat Kınıklıoğlu, ‘“Neo‐Ottoman’ Turkey?,” Project Syndicate, December 3, 2009. 64. “Interview with Mitat Çelikpala: Turkey–Armenia Protocol and Beyond,” TÜRKSAM Armenian Desk, October 5, 2009. 65. “Azerbaijan Adopts Military Doctrine at Long Last,” RFE/RL, June 9, 2010.
Publication Year: 2011
Publication Date: 2011-03-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 14
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