Title: Counterfactuals vs. conditional probabilities: A critical analysis of the counterfactual theory of information
Abstract: Cohen and Meskin 2006 Cohen, Jonathan and Meskin, Aaron. 2006. An Objective Counterfactual Theory of Information. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84: 333–352. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] recently offered a counterfactual theory of information to replace the standard probabilistic theory of information. They claim that the counterfactual theory fares better than the standard account on three grounds: first, it provides a better framework for explaining information flow properties; second, it requires a less expensive ontology; and third, because it does not refer to doxastic states of the information-receiving organism, it provides an objective basis. In this paper, I show that none of these is really an advantage. Moreover, the counterfactual theory fails to satisfy one of the basic properties of information flow, namely the Conjunction principle. Thus, I conclude, there is no reason to give up the standard probabilistic theory for the counterfactual theory of information.