Title: Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills
Abstract: In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, consistency w.r.t. technological innovations, so that the non-welfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai–Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions) from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dworkin.
Publication Year: 2003
Publication Date: 2003-02-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 23
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