Title: Schlock and Blah: Counter-insurgency Realities in a Rapid Dominance Era
Abstract: Abstract This article examines the concept of 'shock and awe' in US military thought. It argues that the term derives from two main sources in defense thinking: rapidity in operations and overwhelming military superiority and is reflected in the concept of 'full spectrum dominance'. However, the concept is not well attuned to fighting net-based counter insurgency war in a terrain such as Iraq which depends upon both intelligence gathering and adaptive military organizations. The article concludes that US military thinking should be more attuned to the effects of military force especially on political processes and the capacity of insurgents to mobilize popular support. Notes Correspondence Address: Robert R. Tomes, 11450 Links Dr, Reston, VA 20190, USA. Email: [email protected] 1. On pre-war statements about how the US would be received by Iraqis, see Jeffrey Record (2004) Dark Victory: America's Second War Against Iraq (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press), pp. 95–97. 2. John T. Correll cites a count done by the Washington Post in: What happened to shock and awe, Air Force Magazine, November 2003, p. 52. 3. Harlan K. Ullman & James P. Wade (1996) Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press). 4. Harlan K. Ullman & James P. Wade (1996) Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press). 5. National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004, 'A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow' (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff), p. 21. 6. National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004, 'A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow' (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff), p. 20. 7. General Edward C. Meyer (1982) Low-level conflict: an overview, in: Brian M. Jenkins (Ed.) Terrorism and Beyond: An International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation), p. 39. See also Steven Metz (1995) A flame kept burning: counter-insurgency support after the Cold War, Parameters, Autumn, pp. 31–41. Available at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/metz.htm. 8. Eliot A. Cohen Constraints on America's conduct of small wars (Fall 1984), International Security, 9(2), p. 180. 9. Generals Decker and Taylor, as quoted by Michael Lind (1999) Vietnam, The Necessary War (New York: The Free Press), p. 103. 10. Cohen (note 8) p. 180. 11. Lieutenant General Wallace H. Nutting quoted in Newsweek, 6 June 1983, p. 24; Cited in Cohen, International Security, p. 181. 12. Metz (note 7) p. 6. The field manual was published in 1995. 13. Wolfowitz, cited in James Mann (2004) Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: Viking Publishing), p. 360. 14. Cohen (note 8) p. 180. 15. An example of US defense discourse concerning OIF is Col. Gary L. Crowder (2003) Effects Based Operations Briefing, 19 March. Available on the US Department of Defense web page, http:/www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t3202003_t0319effects.html. 16. For one account of this, see former Senior Advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority, Larry Diamond What went wrong in Iraq, Foreign Affairs, 2004, 83(5), pp. 35–56. 17. Ullman & Wade (note 3) chapter 3, p. 2. 18. Ullman & Wade (note 3) chapter 3, p. 11. 19. James Gleick (1999) Faster: The Acceleration of Just About Everything (New York: Vintage Books). 20. George Lawrence translation, Alexis de Tocqueville (1969) Democracy in American, (New York: Anchor Books), pp. 657–658. 21. Metz (note 7) p. 3. 22. Roger Trinquier (1961) Modern Warfare: A French View of Counter-insurgency, introduction by Bernard Fall (New York: Praeger), p. vii. 23. Trinquier (note 22) p. 6. (Italics in the original.). 24. David Galula (1964) Counter-insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger), p. 6. 25. Galula (note 24) p. 7. 26. Galula (note 24) p. xi. 27. Frank Kitson Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peace-keeping (Harrisburg PA: Stackpole Books, 1971), p. xi. 28. Kitson (note 27) p. xi. 29. Diamond (note 16) p. 37. 30. Galula (note 24) 101. 31. Galula (note 24) p. 102. 32. Galula (note 24) p. 24. 33. Galula (note 24) p. 24. 34. Galula (note 24) pp. 24–25. 35. Galula (note 24) pp. 19–20. 36. Galula (note 24) p. 103. 37. Kitson (note 27) p. 29. 38. Kitson (note 27) p. 29. 39. Kitson (note 27). For a list of past 'causes' and how they developed see pp. 29–32. 40. Galula (note 24) pp. 21–22. 41. Insights into regional Iraqi opinions are provided in a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project report, Capturing Iraqi Voices, July 2004 (Washington, DC: CSIS). 42. Galula (note 24) p. 25. 43. Galula (note 24) p. 100. 44. Galula (note 24) pp. 100–101. 45. Cited in Matt Kelley (2003) US intelligence effort lacking in specialists, San Diego Union-Tribune, 22 November, p. 1. 46. Cited in Matt Kelley (2003) US intelligence effort lacking in specialists, San Diego Union-Tribune, 22 November, p. 1. 47. Kitson (note 27) p. 72. 48. Kitson (note 27) p. 72. 49. Kitson (note 27) p. 72. 50. Kitson (note 27) p. 41. 51. Kitson (note 27) p. 39. 52. 2004 National Military Strategy, (note 5) p. 3. 53. John Lewis Gaddis (2004) Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), p. 92. 54. John Lewis Gaddis (2004) Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), p. 93. 55. Martin van Creveld (1989) Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, (New York: The Free Press), p. 1. 56. Bruce Hoffman (2004) Plan of attack, The Atlantic Monthly (July/August), cited from The Atlantic Online, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/07/hoffman.htm. 57. Kitson (note 27) p.15. 58. David A. Deptula (2001) Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Education Foundation). 59. Michael Noonan and John Hillen provide the term 'decisive action' as a label consolidating the rapid decisive operations and related time and space dominance arguments. See Michael P. Noonan & John Hillen (2002) The Coming Transformation of the US Military? in E-Notes, 4 February (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute). 60. Deptula (note 58) p. 5. 61. Deptula (note 58) p. 6. Additional informationNotes on contributorsRobert Tomes Footnote Correspondence Address: Robert R. Tomes, 11450 Links Dr, Reston, VA 20190, USA. Email: [email protected]
Publication Year: 2005
Publication Date: 2005-02-22
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 5
AI Researcher Chatbot
Get quick answers to your questions about the article from our AI researcher chatbot