Abstract: Previous articleNext article No AccessThe Sizes of LegislaturesGeorge J. StiglerGeorge J. StiglerPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 5, Number 1Jan., 1976 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467542 Views: 26Total views on this site Citations: 69Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1976 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Alessia De Santo, Benoît Le Maux On the optimal size of legislatures: An illustrated literature review, European Journal of Political Economy 81 (Oct 2022): 102317.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102317Thalia Gerzso, Nicolas van de Walle The Politics of Legislative Expansion in Africa, Comparative Political Studies 1 (Mar 2022): 001041402210742.https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221074277Khoirul Aswar, Alvin Yoga Fanany, Mahendro Sumardjo, Meilda Wiguna, Eka Hariyani Determinant factors on the disclosure level of local government's financial statements in Indonesia, Public and Municipal Finance 11, no.11 (Feb 2022): 1–9.https://doi.org/10.21511/pmf.11(1).2022.01Peter T. 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Mark Crain On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets, Journal of Political Economy 85, no.44 (Oct 2015): 829–842.https://doi.org/10.1086/260602 W. Mark Crain , and Robert D. Tollison Legislative Size and Voting Rules, The Journal of Legal Studies 6, no.11 (Oct 2015): 235–240.https://doi.org/10.1086/467569Robert D. Tollison Legislators, (): 677–680.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_134John Charles Bradbury, W. Mark Crain Bicameralism, (): 363–365.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_40
Publication Year: 1976
Publication Date: 1976-01-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 106
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