Title: Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith's "The Moral Problem"
Abstract: Previous articleNext article No AccessSymposium on Michael Smith's "The Moral Problem"Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith's "The Moral Problem"David CoppDavid CoppPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 108, Number 1Oct., 1997 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/233787 Views: 94Total views on this site Citations: 41Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1997 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:David Heering Why and When is Pure Moral Motivation Defective, Erkenntnis 20 (Apr 2022).https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00550-wAlexander Leferman A Davidsonian Account of the Practicality of Practical Reasoning, Res Philosophica 99, no.11 (Jan 2022): 67–89.https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2167Xiao Zhang Why de dicto desires are fetishistic, Ratio 163 (Jun 2021).https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12317William Ratoff How Humeans can make normative beliefs motivating, Philosophical Studies 178, no.44 (May 2020): 1245–1265.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01473-4Zoë A. Johnson King Praiseworthy Motivations, Noûs 54, no.22 (Feb 2019): 408–430.https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12276Corine Besson Logical Expressivism and Carroll's Regress, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86 (Sep 2019): 35–62.https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246119000043Amelia Hicks Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100, no.33 (Apr 2019): 765–789.https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12274Jussi Suikkanen Judgment Internalism: an Argument from Self-Knowledge, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21, no.33 (Aug 2018): 489–503.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9923-5Marcela Herdova , 129 ( 2018): 125.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92759-6_7Brendan Cline Smith's practicality requirement meets dual-process models of moral judgment, Philosophical Psychology 30, no.88 (Jun 2017): 1043–1063.https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1333093Wesley Buckwalter, John Turri In the Thick of Moral Motivation, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8, no.22 (Mar 2016): 433–453.https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0306-3Ron Aboodi One Thought Too Few: Where De Dicto Moral Motivation is Necessary, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20, no.22 (Aug 2016): 223–237.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9742-5Michael Bukoski A Critique of Smith's Constitutivism, Ethics 127, no.11 (Sep 2016): 116–146.https://doi.org/10.1086/687339Sarah Sawyer MINDS AND MORALS, Philosophical Issues 24, no.11 (Sep 2014): 393–408.https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12039Wesley Buckwalter, John Turri In the Thick of Moral Motivation, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2014).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2382383Robert Mabrito On Some Recent Attempts to Resolve the Debate between Internalists and Externalists, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 51, no.22 (Jun 2013): 179–205.https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12013Vanessa Carbonell De dicto desires and morality as fetish, Philosophical Studies 163, no.22 (Oct 2011): 459–477.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9825-zDavid Sobel Motivation, Humean Theory of, (Feb 2013).https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee208Elinor Mason Value Pluralism, (Feb 2013).https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee575Ragnar Francén Olinder Svavarsdóttir's Burden, Philosophia 40, no.33 (Nov 2011): 577–589.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9339-0Christine Clavien, Colby J. Tanner, Fabrice Clément, Michel Chapuisat, Attila Szolnoki Choosy Moral Punishers, PLoS ONE 7, no.66 (Jun 2012): e39002.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0039002F. Bjorklund, G. Bjornsson, J. Eriksson, R. Francen Olinder, C. Strandberg Recent Work on Motivational Internalism, Analysis 72, no.11 (Nov 2011): 124–137.https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr118Eric Vogelstein Morality, reasons, and sentiments, Philosophical Studies 155, no.33 (Jul 2010): 421–432.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9579-zChristine Tappolet, Alain Voizard La philosophie de la normativité ou comment tenter de faire un peu d'ordre, Dialogue 50, no.22 (Oct 2011): 239–246.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217311000485Danielle Bromwich How Not to Argue for Motivational Internalism, (Jan 2011): 64–87.https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230305885_5OWEN ANDERSON MORAL OBJECTIVITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN ETHICS: A SOCRATIC RESPONSE TO HUME'S LEGACY IN THE 20 TH CENTURY, The Heythrop Journal 51, no.22 (Mar 2010): 178–191.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2009.00497.xDavid Copp Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness, (Nov 2009): 141–165.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_9Vanessa Carbonell What Moral Saints Look Like, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, no.33 (Jan 2020): 371–398.https://doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0057David Wall Are There Passive Desires?, Dialectica 63, no.22 (Jun 2009): 133–155.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01187.xJesse Steinberg Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 35 (Jan 2020): 1–24.https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2009.10717641Christian Miller Gert on Subjective Practical Rationality, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11, no.55 (Aug 2008): 551–561.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9121-yElinor Mason VIII-An Argument Against Motivational Internalism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 108, no.1part21part2 (Jul 2008): 135–156.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2008.00240.xChristian Basil Miller Motivational internalism, Philosophical Studies 139, no.22 (Jun 2007): 233–255.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9115-yDavid Copp The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 33 (Jan 2020): 97–130.https://doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0079 Introduction, (Sep 2004): 1–14.https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606977.002 The Incoherence Argument: Reply to Schafer-Landau, (Sep 2004): 43–55.https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606977.004 Exploring the Implications of the Dispositional Theory of Value, (Sep 2004): 297–317.https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606977.016Joshua Gert Brute Rationality, (Sep 2009).https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487088PHILIP CLARK Kantian Morals and Humean Motives, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68, no.11 (Jan 2004): 109–126.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00328.xJonas Olson Are Desires De Dicto Fetishistic?, Inquiry 45, no.11 (Mar 2002): 89–96.https://doi.org/10.1080/002017402753556634David Copp Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity, (): 249–283.https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511497940.010
Publication Year: 1997
Publication Date: 1997-10-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 141
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