Title: Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards
Abstract: Multi-unit auctions in which bidders can win a variable number of units differ significantly from multi-unit auctions in which bidders can only win one unit. In an independent-private-values, pay-your-bid auction where bidders may win up to two units, we show that first-order conditions imply separating and pooling of bids must both occur with positive probability. This behavior is not found in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. It also contrasts with asymmetric first-price auctions of a single good, whose first-order conditions are superficially similar. A uniform-distribution example is analyzed numerically.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44, D82, C72.
Publication Year: 1998
Publication Date: 1998-04-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 90
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