Title: Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate
Abstract: Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 77, Issue 2 p. 334-358 Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate MATTHEW CHRISMAN, MATTHEW CHRISMAN University of EdinburghSearch for more papers by this author MATTHEW CHRISMAN, MATTHEW CHRISMAN University of EdinburghSearch for more papers by this author First published: 03 September 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00194.xCitations: 32Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Bibliography Ayer, A. J. (1946) Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd edition, Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 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