Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, a set of replies to Richard Rorty's then‐pragmatist criticisms, Davidson defends a coherence theory of truth that is not incompatible but in fact yields a correspondence theory. He argues that the common ground for the theories are considerations of meaning and the objective truth‐conditions that state when meanings are given. Coherence, then, is supposed to be a test for both truth and the judgement that objective truth‐conditions are justified, yielding what Davidson calls a ‘non‐confrontational’ correspondence and a realist stance in all departments involved.
Publication Year: 2001
Publication Date: 2001-09-27
Language: en
Type: book-chapter
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 591
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