Title: Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?
Abstract: Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. See C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (July/August 2006); also see the writings of Harsh V. Pant, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/authors/581/harsh-v-pant. For a more comprehensive examination of national security coalitions, see Kanti P. Bajpai, "War, Peace and International Order: India's View of World Politics," in Project on Conflict or Convergence: Global Perspectives on War, Peace, and International Order, Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies (Cambridge, MA: Weatherhead Center, 1998); and Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Press, 2001), chapter 2, "The World View of India's Strategic Elite." 2. For Gandhi's and Nehru's view on use of force, see Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (New York: Oxford University Press U.S.A., 2001), pp. 57–87. 3. See Robert S. Anderson, "Patrick Blackett in India: Military Consultant and Scientific Intervenor, 1947–1972, Part I," Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 53, no. 2 (May 1999): pp. 253–273; and Anderson, "Empire's Setting Sun? Patrick Blackett and Military and Scientific Development of India," Economic and Political Weekly 36, no. 39 (September 29-October 5, 2001): pp. 3703–3720. 4. For a good general history of the Kashmir conflict, see Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1997). 5. For a still-valuable history of the 1962 war, see Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970). 6. See Sunil Dasgupta, "The Indian Army and the Problem of Military Change," in Security and South Asia: Ideas, Institutions, and Initiatives, ed. Swarna Rajagopalan (New Delhi: Routledge, 2006). 7. See Lachhman Singh Lehl, Missed Opportunities Indo-Pak War 1965 (Dehradun: Natraj Publishers, 2005). On stalemate, see Major A.H. Amin, The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965: A Strategic and Operational Analysis, December 30, 2001, http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/pakistan/aminkhemkaran.html. 8. For the most comprehensive and balanced history of the 1971 war, see Leo Rose and Richard Sisson, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); a brilliant reexamination of the conflict is by Sarmila Bose, Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War (London: Hurst and Co., 2011). 9. For a critical account of military modernization in India during the 1980s, see Chris Smith, India's Ad-hoc Arsenal (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994). 10. On Brasstacks, see Kanti Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervez Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Crisis Perception and Management in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995). 11. Krishnaswami K. Sundarji, Blind Men of Hindoostan: Indo-Pak Nuclear War (New Delhi: UBS Publishers, 1993). 12. On the Indian Peace Keeping Force, see Harkirat Singh, Intervention in Sri Lanka: the I.P.K.F. Experience Retold (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007); see also S. C. Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1992). 13. See P.R. Chari, Pervaiz I. Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process (Washington: Brookings Press, 2007). 14. See Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004 (New York: Routledge, 2006). 15. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: Secret Story of India's Quest to Be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2000). 16. Ashley J. Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2005), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_India_strategy_2006.FINAL.pdf. 17. Rodney W. Jones, "Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia," Research Paper No. 1, (University of Bradford: South Asia Strategic Stability Unit, March 2005), http://www.policyarchitects.org/pdf/Conventional_imbalance_RJones.pdf. 18. Rajesh Rajagopalan, Second Strike: Arguments about Nuclear War in South Asia (New Delhi: Viking India, 2005); see also Ashley J. Tellis, "The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship," International Security 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): pp. 113–151. 19. The comment, made on a television show, has been widely reported. See BBC profile of Fernandes, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1223625.stm. Fernandes later retracted the comment. See George Fernandes and Jaya Jaitly, "There's an elephant in the room," The Little Magazine VII, no. 3&4, http://www.littlemag.com/security/georgefernandes.html. 20. George Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R4207.pdf. 21. Stephen P. Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). 22. Bharat Karnad, Dealing with Reality: India's Thermonuclear Force as Strategic Safety Net and Security Stabilizer in the Indian Ocean Region (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2004); Brahma Chellany, Securing India's Future in the New Millennium (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999). 23. Both Talbott and Singh have written their accounts. See Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Jaswant Singh, A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent India (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2006). 24. Pew Global Attitudes Project "America's Image Remains Strong: Indians See Threat From Pakistan, Extremist Groups," October 20, 2010, http://pewglobal.org/2010/10/20/indians-see-threat-from-pakistan-extremist-groups/. 25. Karen DeYoung, "Pakistan Doubles its Nuclear Arsenal," The Washington Post, January 31, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/30/AR2011013004682.html. 26. Amitav Ranjan, "Arjun, Main Battle Tanked," Indian Express, November 27, 2006, http://www.indianexpress.com/story_print.php?storyId=16589; Manu Pubby, "What Went Wrong with LCA, Arjun Tank, Akash Missile," Indian Express, March 3, 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/what-went-wrongwith-lca-arjun-tank-akash/429935/. For a more comprehensive critique, see Richard Bitzinger, "India's Once and Future Defence Industry," RSIS Commentaries, October 8, 2007, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1052007.pdf. 27. On Cold Start, see Walter Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 158–190. 28. For Indian and Chinese defense budgets, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database," http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers. 29. See Karnad, Dealing with Reality. Additional informationNotes on contributorsSunil Dasgupta Sunil Dasgupta is Director of University of Maryland–Baltimore County's Political Science Program at the Universities at Shady Grove. They are the co-authors of Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization, published in September 2010 by the Brookings Institution Press Stephen P. Cohen Stephen P. Cohen is Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. They are the co-authors of Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization, published in September 2010 by the Brookings Institution Press
Publication Year: 2011
Publication Date: 2011-03-24
Language: en
Type: article
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