Title: ON A CLASS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA WITH MEMORY STRATEGIES FOR NONZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
Abstract:A two-player nonzero-sum differential game is considered. Given a pair of threat payoff functions, we characterise a set of pairs of acceptable feedback controls. Any such pair induces a history-depen...A two-player nonzero-sum differential game is considered. Given a pair of threat payoff functions, we characterise a set of pairs of acceptable feedback controls. Any such pair induces a history-dependent Nash δ-equilibrium as follows: the players agree to use the acceptable controls unless one of them deviates. If this happens, a feedback control punishment is implemented. The problem of finding a pair of "acceptable" controls is significantly simpler than the problem of finding a feedback control Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the former may have a solution in case the latter does not. In addition, if there is a feedback control Nash equilibrium, then our technique gives a subgame perfect Nash δ-equilibrium that might improve the payoff function for at least one player.Read More
Publication Year: 2000
Publication Date: 2000-06-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 1
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