Title: Strategic Innovation with Complete and Incomplete Labour Market Contracts
Abstract: In a model of strategic R&D competition between two firms that negotiate with independent unions we show that: (i) incomplete labour market contracts may Pareto‐dominate complete labour market contracts (ii) even when complete contracts Pareto‐dominate incomplete contracts, economies can get stuck in the incomplete contract equilibrium. These conclusions provide additional strategic reasons why complete labour market contracts may not be used—even if they were feasible. We propose two testable predictions to discriminate between complete and incomplete contracts: (i) the variance of wages is lower with complete contracts; (ii) the variance of employment is higher under complete contracts.
Publication Year: 2001
Publication Date: 2001-06-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 42
AI Researcher Chatbot
Get quick answers to your questions about the article from our AI researcher chatbot