Title: Socialism, knowledge, the instrumental valuation principle and the enhancement of individual dignity
Abstract: Abstract Abstract Socialism is frequently associated with central planning, public ownership, anathema to markets and the emasculation of the individual. Recent market socialist contributions attempt to overcome socialism's seeming resistance to markets. However, such contributions are frequently undermined by Hayek's invocation of fragmented knowledge. This article endeavours to contribute to a broadly conceived socialism that is not grounded in a particular array of institutions, but one which, via the instrumental valuation principle, the capabilities approach and Dewey's conceptualization of knowledge, offers the prospect of enhancing individual dignity. The instrumental valuation principle is viewed as key to socialism's engagement with dignity as it provides the framework for the enhancement of egalitarianism, democracy and the undermining of invidious institutional arrangements. Keywords: socialisminstrumental valuation principleknowledgeindividual dignitydemocracycapabilities Notes 1 John Dewey has frequently been proclaimed as the USA's most prominent philosopher (see, for instance, Bertrand Russell's History of Western philosophy), but, as Haack (2004 Haack, S. 2004. Pragmatism, old and new. Contemporary Pragmatism, 1: 3–41. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) reports, Dewey insisted that philosophy had to be wedded to life in that it had political and social relevance. Dewey was a leading and active social reformer and was involved in the founding of several associations, including the American Council of Civil Liberties, and was a member of the commission dispatched to Mexico to investigate Stalin's charges against Trotsky. Dewey is strongly associated with other pragmatist philosophers, especially Charles Sanders Peirce, and was the central influence on development of the IVP – hence the focus on him. 2 Given the nature of the arguments presented here a further dimension emerges which, of necessity, this article can only touch upon. The interfaces between institutional economics, Marxism and socialism are complex and contested terrains, which space precludes us from entering beyond noting that Veblenian and Marxian analyses demonstrate complementarities as well as substantive differences (see Cullenberg, 1999 Cullenberg, S. 1999. Overdetermination, totality, and institutions: A genealogy of Marxist institutionalist economics. Journal of Economic Issues, 33: 801–15. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]; Dugger & Sherman, 2000 Dugger, W. M. and Sherman, H. J. 2000. Reclaiming evolution: A dialogue between Marxism and institutionalism on social change, London and New York: Routledge. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Garnett, 1999 Garnett, R. F. 1999. Postmodernism and theories of value: New grounds for institutionalist/Marxist dialogue?. Journal of Economic Issues, 33: 817–34. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Hodgson, 2004 Hodgson, G. M. 2004. The evolution of institutional economics: Agency, structure and Darwinism in American institutionalism, London: Routledge. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; O'Hara, 2000 O'Hara, P. A. 2000. Marx, Veblen and contemporary institutional political economy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. [Google Scholar]). 3 For us, Polanyi's rejection of Mises' framing holds particular appeal as it opens up and broadens the conception of socialism to a plurality of meanings beyond the confines of central planning and nationalization of industry. Such a model is likely to be highly undemocratic in practice, particularly where industries remain organized on a large-scale national basis (see Clarke, 1993 Clarke, S. 1993. "The contradictions of state socialism". In What about the workers?, Edited by: Clarke, S., Fairbrother, P., Burawoy, M. and Krotov, P. London: Verso. [Google Scholar]). At the same time, for an economic system to be democratic requires a level of subsidiarity, variety and choice which is simply not present under centrally imposed planning regimes. 4 Such Marxian economic determinism has been extensively criticized, notably by those who are broadly sympathetic to Marx, such as Foucault and Veblen (see Kumar, 2005 Kumar, C. 2005. Foucault and Rorty on truth and ideology: A pragmatist view from the left. Contemporary Pragmatism, 2(1): 35–93. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). 5 The codification of tacit knowledge as an error of commission is not confined to socialist models. Mainstream economists, such as Dasgupta and David (1994 Dasgupta, P. and David, P. 1994. Towards a new economics of science. Research Policy, 23: 487–521. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), argue that tacit knowledge is an increasingly redundant concept since the boundary between tacit and codified knowledge is determined by costs and benefits, and the increasing sophistication of information technology is converting tacit into codified knowledge. Contra Dasgupta and David, learning is the key here and can convert conscious deliberation, or rule following, into a process of routine and into tacit background knowledge. Hence, expert knowledge acquired through practice over a period of time is difficult, if not impossible, to codify, and creates the distinction between 'know how' and 'know that' (Nightingale, 2003 Nightingale, P. 2003. If Nelson and Winter are only half right about tacit knowledge, which half? A Searlean critique of 'codification'. Industrial and Corporate Change, 12: 149–83. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). This is important as we assert in the final section there may be a case for unlearning in certain contexts. 6 There are clearly similarities with postmodern conceptions of knowledge here. However, in the main, institutionalists have been fairly resistant to postmodernism (see Garnett's [1999 Hodgson, G. M. 1999. Economics and utopia, London: Routledge. [Google Scholar]] advocacy of postmodernism and Hodgson's [2004] critique). 7 Neurath and Dewey share some association in the unity of science project to which Dewey (1939 Dewey, J. 1939. "Theory of valuation". In Foundations of the unity of science: Toward an international encyclopedia of unified science, Edited by: Neurath, O., Carnap, R. and Morris, C. Vol. 2, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (nos. 1–9) [Google Scholar]) contributed and which Neurath co-edited. It is obvious that there is some correspondence between Dewey and Neurath on issues such as subsidiarity, but there appear to be important differences, chiefly relating to Neurath's embrace of logical positivism and Dewey's rejection of it. 8 Dewey's instrumentalism should not be confused with the instrumentalism of some contemporary commentaries, most notably that of Milton Friedman in economics. This approach considers that scientific hypotheses possess no truth value in themselves; they are merely tools for prediction. By contrast, Dewey defines instrumentalism in terms of how thought functions in the experimental determination of further actions (Haack, 2004 Haack, S. 2004. Pragmatism, old and new. Contemporary Pragmatism, 1: 3–41. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 16). In effect, instrumentalism refers to the connectedness between means and ends; and, as Tool (1993 Tool, M. R. 1993. "The theory of instrumental value: Extensions, clarifications". In Institutional economics: Theory, method, policy, Edited by: Tool, M. R. Dordrecht: Kluwer. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) notes, alludes to a continuum between means and ends (or consequences). 9 Veblen described institutions as the 'settled habits of thought in the body of men' (1990 [1919], p. 239). This reflects the key role of habit in Veblenian analysis deriving from the influence of the instinct psychologists and Dewey (see Hodgson, 2004 Hodgson, G. M. 2004. The evolution of institutional economics: Agency, structure and Darwinism in American institutionalism, London: Routledge. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). He argued: 'institutions – economic structure – may be roughly distinguished into two classes or categories, according as they serve one or other of two divergent purposes of economic life' (Veblen, 1994 [1899], p. 208). These purposes include acquisition or production, pecuniary or industrial activities, and Veblen further distinguishes between 'salesmanship' and 'workmanship', and 'vested interest' and the 'common man' (see also Tool, 1993 Tool, M. R. 1993. "The theory of instrumental value: Extensions, clarifications". In Institutional economics: Theory, method, policy, Edited by: Tool, M. R. Dordrecht: Kluwer. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). Moreover, Veblen highlights a dichotomy between 'invidious' and 'non-invidious' interest. Veblen's categorization is the basis of his criticisms of the 'leisure class', that part of society that does not contribute to economic well-being and extracts pecuniary benefits from others. While this undoubtedly resonates with Marx, Veblen did not tar all capitalists with the same brush: he admired those who contributed to industrial technology and production, although we would note here that this might efface the centrality of exploitation at work to the suppression of the individual within capitalism (Holloway, 2004 Holloway, J. 2004. Change the world without taking power: The meaning of revolution today, London: Pluto. [Google Scholar]). 10 Tool is heavily influenced by the works of John Fagg Foster and Clarence Ayres. Ayres is often considered to be one of the 'second generation' of institutionalists (along with John Commons and Wesley Mitchell) following the seminal work of Veblen. Ayres is a controversial figure in that he is frequently credited with synthesizing the work of Dewey and Veblen through his development of the so-called 'Veblenian dichotomy' between ceremonial and instrumental values. However, there are significant differences between Ayres and Dewey and Veblen. For instance, Hodgson (2004 Hodgson, G. M. 2004. The evolution of institutional economics: Agency, structure and Darwinism in American institutionalism, London: Routledge. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) is among those (including Philip Mirowski) who note Ayres' eschewal of both Dewey's and Veblen's references to the importance of habit. Ayres also considered that the resolution of valuation problems would be accomplished through the accumulation of scientific knowledge concerning the provisioning of human needs. By contrast Dewey emphasized the experimental nature of science, its fallibility and the embeddedness of scientific process within institutions. Our approach is resolutely Deweyan, although we endeavour not to throw out the instrumentalist baby with the Ayresian bathwater through our emphases on justice and individual dignity – concerns of both Ayres and Dewey. 11 Beyond Dewey's criticisms of utilitarianism, he was scornful of neo–classical economics, believing that neo–classical economists were the apologists of capitalism. Tilman (1998 Tilman, R. 1998. John Dewey as user and critic of Thorstein Veblen's ideas. Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 20: 145–60. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) outlines Dewey's dismissal of the neo–classical conflation of value and the presumption that the only measure of value is price. Dewey asserted that this stemmed from neo–classical economics' methodological individualism with its consequent lack of social realism. As Tilman observes: 'Dewey, of course, viewed this as a self-serving and unscientific doctrine aimed at reinforcing social hierarchy and inequality both of which he strongly disliked' (1998, p. 149). 12 Veblen was sympathetic to much of Marx's writings, but was highly critical of what he viewed as Marx's teleological, metaphysical and overly rational approach. Marx's teleology arises from his analysis being driven by its desired outcomes, as opposed to consequences emerging from analysis, although there is a tradition of more 'open' Marxism (see, for example, Bonefeld & Psychopedis, 2005 Bonefeld, W. and Psychopedis, K. 2005. Human dignity, Aldershot: Ashgate. [Google Scholar]; Cleaver, 1978 Cleaver, H. 1978. Reading capital politically, London: Monthly Review Press. [Google Scholar]; Holloway, 2004 Holloway, J. 2004. Change the world without taking power: The meaning of revolution today, London: Pluto. [Google Scholar]) that roots a class perspective more firmly with an unfolding dynamic of struggle. Veblen also criticized Marx's value theory for presuming that agents were inherently calculative (see, for example, Hodgson, 1999 Hodgson, G. M. 1999. Economics and utopia, London: Routledge. [Google Scholar]; Veblen, 1990 Veblen, T. B. 1990 [1919]. The place of science in modern civilization, New Brunswick, London, NJ: Transaction Books. [Google Scholar] [1919]). 13 Levine explicitly attributes the source of his argument to Marx. However, while he fails to recognize Veblen, it is important to appreciate that Veblen, like Marx, considered that a fundamental feeling of self and identity was associated with work. Veblen went further than Marx in considering that humans possessed an instinct for creativity – for craftsmanship. Hence, highly routinized work (e.g. on assembly lines or in call centres) that fails to engage the worker is dehumanizing in that it curbs human instinct in addition to being a source of alienation: in effect, an invidious source of distinction. 14 Such a correspondence may not be entirely surprising given that Nussbaum and Putnam share the same philosophical influences as institutional economists having common affiliations to Dewey and Peirce (see Haack, 2004 Haack, S. 2004. Pragmatism, old and new. Contemporary Pragmatism, 1: 3–41. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). 15 Avio (2004 Avio, K. L. 2004. A modest proposal for institutional economics. Journal of Economic Issues, 38: 715–45. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]) has presented a case that the IVP lacks an analysis of legitimation in its reference to deliberative democracy. Avio advocates the employment of Habermasian discourse analysis.
Publication Year: 2010
Publication Date: 2010-05-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 9
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