Title: Free revealing and the private-collective model for innovation incentives
Abstract: R&D ManagementVolume 36, Issue 3 p. 295-306 Free revealing and the private-collective model for innovation incentives Eric Von Hippel, Eric Von Hippel Sloan School of Management, MIT, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge MA 02139, USA [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorGeorg Von Krogh, Georg Von Krogh ETH Zurich, Department of Management, Technology, and Economics, Kreuzplatz 5, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Eric Von Hippel, Eric Von Hippel Sloan School of Management, MIT, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge MA 02139, USA [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorGeorg Von Krogh, Georg Von Krogh ETH Zurich, Department of Management, Technology, and Economics, Kreuzplatz 5, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 25 May 2006 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2006.00435.xCitations: 189AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract A central tenant of open innovation is free revealing of the detailed workings of novel products and services, so that others may use them, learn from them, and perhaps improve them as well. We explain that innovators frequently do freely reveal proprietary information and knowledge regarding both information-based products and physical products they have developed. We explain why free revealing can make good economic sense for innovators and for society as well. The article develops the case for free revealing in terms of a 'private collective' model of innovation incentives. References Allen, R.C. (1983) Collective invention. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 4, 1, 1–24. Arora, A., Fosfuri, A. and Gambardella, A. (2001) Markets for Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Arrow, K. (1962) Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for inventions. In R.R. 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Publication Year: 2006
Publication Date: 2006-06-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 331
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