Title: Strong Core and Competitive Equilibria of an Exchange Market with Indivisible Goods
Abstract: The author considers an exchange model with indivisible goods and a perfectly divisible good, namely, money. This model was presented by M. Quinzii (1984) as an extension of the Shapley-Scarf model without divisible goods. The author proves that the strong core always coincides with the set of competitive allocations. Two examples show that these two sets can be strictly included in the core and, in an extreme case, disappear while the core still exists. Such phenomena do not occur under an indispensability assumption on money. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Publication Year: 1991
Publication Date: 1991-11-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 8
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