Abstract: In this article, I explore the ramifications of a vetogates model of the legislative process. The vetogates model focuses on the many points in the legislative process where proposed legislation can be stopped (vetoed). A political system where statutes must pass through a variety of filters, each motivated by somewhat different incentives and interests, is one where (1) statutes are hard to enact; (2) statutes that are enacted will tend to have compromises, logrolls, and delegations; and, (3) once enacted, statutes are hard to repeal. These consequences represent a significant cost of the vetogates model to our system of governance, but they also carry some potential benefits. I explore the ramifications of the vetogates model for legal doctrine. For example, the vetogates model supports judicial consultation of legislative history in statutory cases and suggests the virtue of deliberation-rewarding canons for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations.
Publication Year: 2012
Publication Date: 2012-04-19
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 11
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