Title: Race, Redistricting and Minority Officeholding in Congress and State Legislatures, 1960s to 2008
Abstract: This paper tries to identify the forces behind the increases in black and Latino officeholding in Congress and state legislatures seen since the 1960s. My work shows that although race relations have improved dramatically since the mid-20th century, race continues to play a profound role in American legislative politics. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, blacks and Latinos were underrepresented in the House of Representatives. During this period, African Americans enjoyed some success in shrinking the representation gap in the Congress; however, this gap actually grew for Hispanics. I also find that blacks and Hispanics were often underrepresented in state legislative districts. My analyses suggest that variations in levels of minority officeholding in Congress and state legislatures are largely explained by the interaction between levels of racially-polarized voting in electoral systems and the racial composition of electoral districts within those systems. I find that levels of racially-polarized voting are generally high in legislative elections, but vary significantly by region and level of government. My analyses generally confirm charges that majority-minority districts waste minority votes in congressional contests. However, this does not appear to be true in state legislative races. These findings should remind researchers that the impact redistricting has on minority officeholding can vary by time, region and level of government. For example, my analyses suggest that the 1990s round of redistricting triggered a dramatic jump in black and Latino officeholding in Congress and state legislatures. Increases in black officeholding were sharpest in the South, especially in states covered by section 5 of the Voting Right Act of 1965. Surges in Latino officeholding were largely confined to the states of the Southwest that were covered by section 5 of the VRA. In contrast, levels of minority officeholding in Congress and state legislatures increased only modestly after the 2000 round of redistricting. My analyses show that this result is a product of the fact that the 2000 round of redistricting resulted in only modest changes in the racial composition of most congressional and state legislative districts. Finally, my survey of congressional and state legislative redistricting plans adopted in the 1990s and 2000s identify two diametrically opposed routes to achieving proportional representation for minorities in legislative settings. I argue New Mexico seems to have embraced a color blind politics, while Alabama embodied a race-neutral politics. Taken together, the findings in this paper provide fresh insight into a question political scientists have grappled with since the 1960s: “Who governs?” This paper suggests that the answer to that question is not determined by elections, but is instead decided by the small group of obscure, local politicians who control the redistricting process. This paper argues that these mapmakers have so much control over who wins congressional and state legislative seats that in many ways the role of voters in elections has been reduced to rubber stamping power-sharing agreements, which are expressed in the form of redistricting plans.
Publication Year: 2009
Publication Date: 2009-08-26
Language: en
Type: article
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