Title: Sector choices for public service delivery The transaction cost implications of executive turnover
Abstract: The question of whether private firms should contract out for products and services or provide them internally (i.e. become more vertically integrated) has been a topic that has concerned scholars for many years. This article argues that the transaction costs in local contracting choices are linked to the characteristics of political systems that influence political and administrative uncertainty. Our analysis examines the transaction costs that result from executive turnover. Specifically, we are concerned with how uncertainty resulting from turnover in leadership positions in city government affects the ability of a municipality to negotiate contracts, make credible commitments to suppliers and faithfully uphold and enforce contracts once they are in force. We find that manager turnover reduces the likelihood of contracting with private sector providers. Mayor turnover has the opposite effect increasing contracting with both government and for-profit providers.
Publication Year: 2003
Publication Date: 2003-06-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 13
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