Title: The Conflict Resolution and Counterterrorism Dilemma: Turkey Faces its Kurdish Question
Abstract: Abstract This article considers the relationship between two processes—conflict resolution and counterterrorism—which conceptually share many common points, yet in practice do not necessarily proceed together easily towards a common goal. Considering particular cases of ethnic conflict in which terrorist factions exist, the article argues that while neither conflict resolution nor counterterrorism alone can adequately address the problem, simultaneously conducting both must keep in mind the processes' inherent differences and avoid excessive prioritizing of one over the other. By exploring recent Turkish governmental initiatives to address the Kurdish question, the article attempts to provide an outline for how to successfully cope with the two processes simultaneously. Keywords: conflict resolutioncounterterrorismKurdish questionKurdsPKKterrorismTurkeyTurks Notes An exception may be Jacob Bercovitch and I. William Zartman's chapter on "Terrorism and Conflict Resolution" in The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, eds. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2009), 437–454; even that work, however, focuses on the use of conflict resolution (negotiation) techniques for use in counterterrorism, specifically in hostage negotiations, not on the actual relationship between the two processes. Since conflict resolution is also sometimes associated with democratic expansion and liberalization, another possible exception might be Chenowethi (2010), which looks at democratization and terrorism, and shows that more political competition (democracy) correlates positively with more terrorist activity. Erica Chenowethi, "Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity," Journal of Politics 72 (2010): 16–30. Luis A. Gil-Alana and Carlos P. Barros, "A Note on the Effectiveness of National Anti-Terrorist Policies: Evidence from ETA," Conflict Management and Peace Science 27, no. 1 (2010): 28–46. Arjun Chowdhury and Ronald R. Krebs, "Talking about Terror: Counterterrorist Campaigns and the Logic of Representation," European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 1 (2010): 125–150. Kevin Siqueira and Todd Sandler, "Terrorists versus the Government: Strategic Interaction, Support, and Sponsorship," Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 6 (2006): 878–898. B. Peter Rosendorff and Todd Sandler, "Too Much of a Good Thing? The Proactive Response Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (2004), 657–671. Berkovitch, Kremenyuk, and Zartman (see note 1 above), 10. For example, the Basque public has not always supported the actions and goals of the ETA. See Gil-Alana & Barros (note 2 above). It should be noted that there is a qualitative difference between an environment in which liberalism is relatively embedded and the people can rationally defend and shift their free political will, and one in which the social and political life is determined by religious, tribal, ethnic, and/or primordial hierarchies that limit people's individual assessments and political maneuvering capacity. The northern Middle East, despite newly experienced opening up to the influences of liberalization, remains largely under the influence of traditional social and political structures, which inevitably affects the fate of conflict resolution efforts. For more on the Turkish state's historical handling of the PKK, see Ersel Aydinli, "Between Security and Liberalization: Decoding Turkey's Struggle with the PKK," Security Dialogue 33, no. 2 (June 2002): 209–225. See for example an informal poll taken on whether Turkey's next candidate for the Eurovision song contest should sing in both Turkish and Kurdish. Story available at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Yazar.aspx?aType=YazarDetay&ArticleID=1131056&b=Eurovisiona%20Turkce-Kurtce%20sarkiyla%20katilabilir%20miyiz&KategoriID=26 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008); Gaga Gvineria, "How does Terrorism End?" in Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin (eds.), Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 257–298; Nat Colleta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Lessons and Liabilities in Reconstruction," in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 170–182. The first mention of a move towards some kind of initiative came from President Gul, during his visit to Iran in March 2009, when he said, "Good things will happen in the Kurdish Question" [Kürt sorunun da iyi şeyler olacağını] http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/11179281.asp. Prime Minister Erdoğan assigned the Interior Minister to coordinate the process, http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=872350, and later announced he would himself speak to the Kurdish DTP leader. http://yenisafak.com.tr/Politika/Default.aspx?t=03.08.2009&i=202721 The timing was bad on several fronts. From the government's perspective, it was bad timing with respect to the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). The DTP had gained a significant number of municipalities in the Southeast region in the 2007 election—several of which they had won from the AKP. Since the municiaplities are the symbol of public power, the DTP was enjoying the psychological upperhand over the AKP. Civil-military relations at the time were tense as the government had passed a late-night surprise legislation paving the way for military personnel to be tried in civilian courts. (July 9, 2009). Moreover, the alleged competition between the Prime Minister and the President themselves was heating up, meaning that consensus was not even likely to be found among the ruling elite. For a detailed analysis on the severity of the economic crisis, see the TEPAV Economics Follow up Report, May–June 2009. Available at: http://www.tepav.org.tr/tur/admin/dosyabul/upload/2009_TEPAV_Mali_Izleme_Mayis_Haziran_Raporu.pdf Among these extra monies, the "GAP Action Plan (2008–2012)," made public in 2008, indicated that 12 billion dollars would be invested in the Southeast region. http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/438984.asp Among the responses were those of then opposition party leader Deniz Baykal, "In the name of solving the problem, let's not dissolve Turkey" ["sorun çözeceğiz diye Türkiye'yi çözmeyelim"]. Available at www.chp.org.tr/HaberDetayi.aspx?NewsID=133); and the National Action Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli: "We won't fall into the trap the Kurdish 'opening up'" [Kürt açılımı oyununa gelmeyeceğiz], available at www.stargazete.com/politika/bahceli-kurt-acilimi-bir-oyundur-haber-206595.htm For examples of the two main opposition parties' claims that the "opening up" was an American plan, see: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/SonDakika.aspx?aType=SonDakika&ArticleID=1132106 and http://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/2009/08/25/kurt.acilimi.abdnin.plani.mi/15068/index.html. For a rejection of such claims by the American Embassy in Ankara, see: http://www.haber7.com/haber/20090824/Kurt-Acilimi-ABD-projesi-iddiasina-yanit.php The apparent lack of a framework is implied in the ever-changing reference points for the initiative, from early references to a "Kurdish opening up," http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&KategoriID=4&ArticleID=1120538&Date=23.07.2009&b=Erdogan:%20Kurt%20acilimi%20icin%20calisma%20baslattik&ver=15, to calling it a "democratic opening up," http://www.ntv.com.tr/id/24991846/, and finally, referring to the initiative as a "National Unity Project,"http://samanyolu.com/haber/52945/basbakan-mill%C3%AE-birlik-projesinin-ilk-adimini-attik/ In the absence of a clear plan for the boundaries of the discussion, early debate turned controversial on questions of constitutional reform, leading the government to react with counter-claims that they would not touch the constitution. See both:http://www.haber7.com/haber/20091008/Cicek-Ortak-degerler-ilk-3-madde.php, and http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1134188&b=Anayasa%20degisikligi%20gundemimizde%20yok Chief of Staff İlker Başbuğ, in his speech on 14 April 2009, presented a general outline of the army's approach towards terrorism, and emphasized non-military strategies. He also refers to individual identity rights, and the need to acknowledge those rights. http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2009/org_ilkerbasbug_harpak_konusma_14042009.html Although the Turkish media tend to be very much divided in their positions on the government itself, on the "Opening Up" issue, there was no clear opposition. For example, the more liberal media, generally considered critical of the government (the Dogan group), by and large supported the process, presumably since it was, at heart, a liberal policy. Also necessary to note are allegations that the media may be becoming more fearful of governmental reprisals for negative reporting. For four different surveys from the past two years see: 25.08.2009: http://www.aksam.com.tr/2009/08/25/haber/guncel/6185/gerilim_duserse_destek_artacak_.html; 25.11.2009: http://www.aktifhaber.com/news_detail.php?id=257469; 11.01.2010: http://www.aktifhaber.com/news_detail.php?id=266258; 14.02.2010: http://www.haber3.com/acilima-destek,-ergenekona-veto-550779h.htm An example of this domination can be seen in the words of the Chair of the Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce, a former politician, who despite his earlier anti-PKK views, in the course of the Opening Up process came to express far more favorable views to the PKK: "Nothing will work without the PKK" [PKK Yok Sayilirsa Olmaz] and "Ocalan Cannot be Dismissed" [Öcalan Gözardı Edilmemeli]. Available at http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetay&ArticleID=946354&Date=23.07.2009&CategoryID=77 Sources include Leyla Zana's statement in which she refers to Ocalan openly as the "leader" of the Kurdish movement [Our Leader was in Imrali in '99] "Onderimiz 99'da Imrali'daydi" (Hurriyet, 19.07.09, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6916207.asp?gid=180 and a call from European leaders to the DTP to "distance itself from terrorism." http://www.todayszaman.com/tzweb/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=117904 PKK circles were not only very much in opposition to the initiative, but also referred back to their original goals when starting the struggle decades earlier, including the essential ideas of an autonomous parliament, militia—a de facto separate Kurdish state. See articles from the official PKK news portal: http://www.firatnews.nu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=14514. "The acilim theater will come to an end": http://www.firatnews.nu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=14953; "Karayılan: We'll resist against these classic tactics": http://www.firatnews.nu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=14327; http://www.firatnews.nu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=12070; "Cemil Bayık: The Kurdish nation should get ready for historical resistance": http://www.firatnews.nu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=15117 The PKK itself was born and developed by drawing on the conflictive primordial potential among Kurdish tribes. For example, the organization was responsible for the deaths of certain Chieftains in order to provoke inter-group enmity, and to promote recruitment. Nihat Ali Özcan, PKK, Tarihi &idot;deolojisi ve Yöntemi (Ankara: ASAM Publishing: 1999), 41, 122. Gvineria (see note 11 above). Via his lawyers, Ocalan's ideas are regularly released either in pro-PKK news portals or even in Turkish newspapers. His ideas and positions are allowed to be a part of the discussion and thus shift the debate in various directions. For example, lawyers, after meeting with Ocalan, publish their meeting notes in PKK publications, see e.g., http://www.gundem-online.net/haber.asp?id=35. Also see the public debates on whether Ocalan should be forbidden from talking with his lawyers due to fears that these meetings are actually being used for dissemination of his ideas, e.g., http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/02/25/ocalanin.avukatlariyla.gorusmesi.yasaklanabilir/565281.0/index.html. Ocalan has even been known to scold the Kurdish political leaders, e.g., "I Keep Getting Scolded by Ocalan" ['Öcalan'dan habire fırça yiyip duruyorum'], http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/24970655/ Former opposition Leader Baykal was quoted as saying, "The Law was Assaulted to Protect the PKK," http://www.haberturk.com/polemik/haber/500797-pkkliyi-himaye-icin-hukukun-irzina-gecildi and MHP Leader Bahceli said, "Erdogan, with [this policy] lit the fuse for Turkey's ethnic disintegration," http://www.haber7.com/haber/20090519/Bahceliden-Erdogana-ihanet-suclamasi.php In addition to these accusations, other criticisms by various opposition party members can be seen at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/12910729.asp For a historical background to such categorizations see M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party," Middle East Policy 13, no. 1 (2006): 102–119. See for details and origins of the political Islamist movement among the Kurds in Turkey "Kurdish Investigation" [Kürd Soruşturması] (Ankara: Sor Publishing, 1992); Fulya Atacan, "A Kurdish Islamist Group in Modern Turkey: Shifting Identities," Middle Eastern Studies 37, no. 3 (2001): 111–144; and Hizbullah Terör Örgütü [The Hizbullah Terror Organization] (Ankara: TEMUH Publishing, 2001). Iran's influence on and involvement in the Kurdish Islamist movement was revealed in documents confiscated during police operations against Hizbullah in 2000. This involvement included the military and political training of the organization's leaders in Iran. Also in these documents was evidence of the Islamist Kurdish groups' clashes with the PKK. See for reporting on this: "Iran's Secret Service Trained Velioglu (Hizbullah's leader)" [Velioğlu'nu İran Gizli Servisi eğitti] available at: http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-127621 and "DGM (State Security Court): Iran Trained and Supported Hizbullah" [DGM: Hizbullah'ı İran eğitti ve destekledi] http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-158015 Results can be seen on the webage of the Turkish High Election Council: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2009MahalliIdareler/ResmiGazete/IlGenel.pdf Servet Mutlu, "Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study," International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 4 (1996): 517–541. Mutlu's study makes projections based on the most recent census that measured ethnic background. According to that census in 1965, 9.98% of the population was of Kurdish origin. Mutlu calculated that in 1990 that would have risen to 12.60%, and by 2000 to 13.82%. If we estimate the population in 2009 as being around 15%, out of the total votes cast of 41 million, the DTP's 5.68% (presumably all coming from Kurdish-origin voters) would equal roughly 40% of Kurdish voters. See, for example, information on Turkey's "Green Card" for free health care and the distribution percentages of these free services in the country's Kurdish regions, http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/352745.asp http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=238214 Criminalization of the movement cannot be dismissed, as it is not a secret that there is debate among Islamist Kurds about whether to take advantage of the democratic system or to move further underground and follow a more illegal route. For details of the debate see the website of the Mustazafder Islamist organization: http://www.mustazafder.org/default.asp?sayfa=detay&id=6&Yid=444. Also see debates about the possible starting of an Islamist Kurdish Party—again reflecting the contradicting views: "Is an Islamist Kurdish Party Being Established?" [İslamcı Kürt Partisi mi kuruluyor?] http://www.8sutun.com/Islamci-Kurt-Partisi-mi-kuruluyor_36287.html. The PKK is categorized as a terrorist organization by both the United States and Europe. For Europe see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:023:0037:004, for the U.S. see the Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Available at: http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/terrorism/state/103392.pdf As examples of how the PKK and its leaders influence the legal Kurdish political parties, there is the case of the time when the DTP was closed by the Constitution Court and parliamentary members of the party decided to resign from the Parliament in protest. Shortly after, however, they changed their position, upon receiving clear orders from Ocalan saying that they could remain. "Ocalan: DTP'liler Meclise geri donus yapabilirler" [Ocalan: the DTP MPs can return to the Parliament], December 16, 2009, available at http://www.gundem-online.net/haber.asp?haberid=83803. Similarly, when DTP parliamentarians declared that they would boycott the referendum for constitutional amendments in 2010, they again seemed forced to backtrack after Ocalan announced a different position. "Ocalan: Demokratik Anayasa sarti ile paket desteklenebilir" [Ocalan: With the Condition of a Democratic Constitution the Government's Proposals can be supported], April 21, 2010, available at http://www.gundem-online.net/haber.asp?haberid=90197. Yet another example is that of Ocalan asking for the opening of a "political academy," and the DTP immediately launching the initiative. "Apo: Akademi Kurulmali diyorum" [Apo: An Academy has to be started], available at http://www.gundem-online.net/haber.asp?haberid=75032 and "DTP: Siyaset Akademisini yarin aciyor" [DTP: The Political Academy will open tomorrow], available at http://www.gundem-online.net/haber.asp?haberid=76791 See for the list of DTP municipalities: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2009MahalliIdareler/ResmiGazete/BelediyeBaskanligi.pdf The PKK refers to those voices in the Kurdish community who are critical of the PKK as "counter" forces—implying that they are spies for the Turkish forces. After labeling them in this way, attempts are sometimes made to eliminate them. See for an example a press release by a PKK regional command leader containing "counter" allegations: http://www.firatnews.nu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=14344 and another piece warning of counter elements: http://www.firatnews.nu/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=11935 It is generally assumed that terrorist activity improves the sense of belonging and loyalty among terrorist recruits. Conversely, the lack of conflict and activity may reduce the organization's power to control its members. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 49–79. For a more detailed analysis of the Turkish inner state structure as based on the military's role in Turkish governance, see Ersel Aydinli, "Governments vs. States: Decoding Dual Governance in the Developing World," Third World Quarterly 31, no. 5 (2010): 693–707. Henri J. Barkey comments on Washington's seeming obliviousness to the seriousness of the PKK problem in "Turkey's Silent Crisis," Foreign Policy 31 (August 2010), available at www.foreignpolicy.com Additional informationNotes on contributorsErsel Aydinli Ersel Aydinli is an associate professor in the Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. Nihat Ali Ozcan Nihat Ali Ozcan is a visiting fellow at the University of Oxford Programme on the Changing Character of War.
Publication Year: 2011
Publication Date: 2011-07-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 21
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