Title: What Kind of Ignorance Excuses? Two Neglected Issues
Abstract: The philosophical literature displays a lively debate on the conditions under which ignorance excuses. In this paper, I formulate and defend an answer to two questions that have not yet been discussed in the literature on exculpatory ignorance. First, which kinds of propositional attitudes that count as ignorance provide an excuse? I argue that we need to consider four options here: having a false belief, suspending judgement on a true proposition, being deeply ignorant of a truth, and having a true belief that falls short of knowledge. Secondly, ignorance of which propositions counts as an excuse? I discuss four candidates: ignorance of one's obligation, ignorance that one is able to meet that obligation, ignorance of how to meet that obligation, and lack of foresight regarding that obligation. I argue that we can give a satisfactory account of exculpatory ignorance only if we pay attention to these two neglected issues.
Publication Year: 2014
Publication Date: 2014-03-07
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 59
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