Title: Pareto desirable redistribution: the case of malice and envy
Abstract: In the Generosity Game the agreement payoff of the proposer is fixed whereas that of the responder can be varied by the proposer who chooses the pie size. Increasing the pie size increases the (generosity of the) offer by the same amount. We define a unit-square class of Generosity Games by weakening the payoff consequences resulting from a veto by the responder and discuss how the dictator variants can be used to test inequity aversion parameters. Experimental findings, however, so far question inequity aversion as a dominant motive and thus discourage such attempts of assessing its parameters.
Publication Year: 1973
Publication Date: 1973-04-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 68
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