Title: The Franchise Dilemma: Entrepreneurial Characteristics, Relational Contracting, and Opportunism in Hybrid Governance
Abstract: Journal of Small Business ManagementVolume 54, Issue 1 p. 279-298 Original Article The Franchise Dilemma: Entrepreneurial Characteristics, Relational Contracting, and Opportunism in Hybrid Governance Heiner Evanschitzky, Corresponding Author Heiner EvanschitzkyHeiner Evanschitzky is Professor of Marketing at Aston University, Birmingham, UK.Address correspondence to: Heiner Evanschitzky, University of Aston, Marketing, Birmingham B4 7ET, UK. E-mail: [email protected] for more papers by this authorBarbara Caemmerer, Barbara CaemmererBarbara Caemmerer is Professor of Marketing at ESSCA School of Management, Boulogne-Billancourt, France.Search for more papers by this authorChristof Backhaus, Christof BackhausChristof Backhaus is Professor of Marketing at Newcastle University Business School, UK.Search for more papers by this author Heiner Evanschitzky, Corresponding Author Heiner EvanschitzkyHeiner Evanschitzky is Professor of Marketing at Aston University, Birmingham, UK.Address correspondence to: Heiner Evanschitzky, University of Aston, Marketing, Birmingham B4 7ET, UK. E-mail: [email protected] for more papers by this authorBarbara Caemmerer, Barbara CaemmererBarbara Caemmerer is Professor of Marketing at ESSCA School of Management, Boulogne-Billancourt, France.Search for more papers by this authorChristof Backhaus, Christof BackhausChristof Backhaus is Professor of Marketing at Newcastle University Business School, UK.Search for more papers by this author First published: 15 January 2015 https://doi.org/10.1111/jsbm.12145Citations: 29 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Abstract Using franchise data, we identify that entrepreneurial characteristics of franchisees partially impact on their opportunistic tendencies. Further, relational contracting increases franchisee opportunism by strengthening the opportunism-enhancing impact of entrepreneurial characteristics. These findings point to a key dilemma franchisors need to be aware of: Entrepreneurially minded franchisees who might be better at exploiting market opportunities for their units may also behave more opportunistically, if given the chance through a more relational contracting regime. At the same time, if they perceive the contractual framework as being too rigid, they may be less able to leverage their capabilities, become dissatisfied, and exit the system. Citing Literature Volume54, Issue1January 2016Pages 279-298 RelatedInformation