Title: Dynamics of the evolution of animal conflicts
Abstract: Dynamics are introduced into Maynard Smith's game about the evolution of strategies in animal conflicts. The retaliator strategy is a weak attractor, but this is only a transient property because the game is structurally unstable. When the game is stabilised the retaliator becomes an evolutionarily stable strategy. At the same time another evolutionarily stable strategy appears comprising a mixture of hawks and bullies, and if individuals are allowed to play mixed strategies then this tends to produce a pecking order. Thus the stabilised game offers an explanation for the evolution of hierarchical societies in terms of natural selection acting on individuals.
Publication Year: 1981
Publication Date: 1981-03-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
Access and Citation
Cited By Count: 187
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