Title: Efficient renegotiation—proof equilibria in repeated games
Abstract: We show that if a generic two-person finite game is repeated infinitely many times then, for discount factors sufficiently near 1, there exists a Pareto-efficient equilibrium that is weakly renegotiation-proof in the sense of J. Farrell and E. Maskin (1989, “Renegotiation in Repeated Games,” Games Econ. Behav. 1, 327–360). One corollary of this proposition is a linear algebraic result that has some connection with Farkas's Lemma.
Publication Year: 1989
Publication Date: 1989-12-01
Language: en
Type: article
Indexed In: ['crossref']
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Cited By Count: 47
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