Title: Masters of War: Military Dissent & Politics in the Vietnam Era
Abstract: MASTERS OF WAR: Military Dissent & Politics in the Vietnam Era by Robert Buzzanco. 386 pages. Cambridge University Press, New York. 1996. $29.95. The first reaction to this book is another book on why we failed in Vietnam! The second reaction is not much better-a tedious academic treatise by a Vietnam-era antiwar advocate. However, the book is worth persevering through difficult reading and a heavy dose of footnotes. Author Robert Buzzanco contends that contrary to popular Vietnam War mythology portraying an aggressive military force hamstrung by political constraints, US military leaders were actually opposed to involvement in Southeast Asia. The author argues that military leaders tried to force the US president to take a definitive policy stand on involvement so the military would not be blamed for the failure that would eventually result from supporting South Vietnam. Also, Buzzanco accuses military leaders of playing politics. For instance, it seems that service support for involvement was determined more by what would further each service's bureaucratic interests and positions relative to the other services. The contention that the military services put bureaucratic survival ahead of US national interest is disturbing. The author does present credible evidence to support the view that service infighting played a role in the early decision to deploy support and, later, combat forces to Vietnam. However, he does not make the case that service competition was anything other than legitimate differences in approach or that it was detrimental to the nation's security. Buzzanco does not seem to think it was natural for military leaders to try to get definitive policy guidance. Many leaders were products of World War II and Korea and knew the costs of conducting a war. They also understood their ability to act was circumscribed by the US Constitution. The president, as commander in chief, should have better defined the mission. The book has two major shortcomings. The author does not understand the military ethos-the powerfully ingrained sense of subordination to civil authority-and misses the most revealing point of his own research because he is so focused on trying to prove that senior military leaders were dissenters and bureaucrats primarily interested in preserving their institutions. The military bureaucracy's relationship to the political administrations demonstrates that concerns for domestic political survival, with the need to be re-elected, drove much of the decision making on becoming, and then staying, involved in Vietnam. …
Publication Year: 1998
Publication Date: 1998-03-01
Language: en
Type: article
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